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Should New Bills of Rights Address Emerging
International Human Rights Norms?
The Challenge of “Defamation of Religion”
Robert C. Blitt*

I. Introduction: Drafting a Bill of Rights in the 21st Century
The decision to draft a bill of rights heralds a momentous event in any country’s history. In the
latter half of the 20th century, fabricating a penultimate statement addressing the fundamental
rights of individuals and groups and their relationship to the state has typically involved a flurry
of public consultations, negotiations, drafting, and rewrites. Increasingly, however, such drafting
efforts remain incomplete without some effort to observe, understand, and account for
comparative trends related to human rights on the international level as well as in other states. As
A.E. Dick Howard has observed:
The international human rights revolution has had undeniable impact upon
comparative constitutionalism. It is hard to imagine drafters of a new constitution
going about their task unconcerned about human rights standards…For half a
century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has served as a model for
constitution makers. Countless constitutions written since 1948 contain
guarantees that either mirror or draw upon the Declaration.1

* Associate

Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. Member of the Massachusetts Bar. LL.M
2003, J.D. and M.A. (International Relations) 2000, University of Toronto; B.A. 1994, McGill University. An early
draft of this article was presented in Canberra, Australia during a conference on “Cultural and Religious Freedom
Under a Bill of Rights” organized by the University of Adelaide’s Research Unit for the Study of Society, Law and
Religion (RUSSLR) and Brigham Young University’s International Center for Law and Religion Studies (ICLRS). I
am indebted to the organizers, especially Brett Scharffs and Paul Babie, for the invitation to participate and also for
facilitating a fascinating and eye-opening visit to Australia. Thanks also to Rachael Kohn for providing the
opportunity to discuss in more depth some of the issues raised here during an interview for her radio broadcast, The
Spirit of Things. This work would not be possible without the tremendous support of the University of Tennessee
College of Law and the active encouragement of my faculty colleagues. I am also grateful to Erin Daly, Jennifer
Hendricks, and Joe King for their helpful insights into the state of U.S. defamation law. This paper is dedicated with
love my wife Stephanie, whose ability to make time never ceases to amaze, and to our son and traveling companion
Noah Leib. The author welcomes comments on this draft via email.
1 A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler From An Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative
Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 3-41, 18. Although this quote addresses constitutions, it applies equally to
standalone bills of rights.
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There are numerous examples across a wide range of states confirming this practice.2 Recent
drafting efforts in Iraq,3 Afghanistan,4 New Zealand,5 South Africa,6 and all the states of the
former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 7 leap to mind, to name but a few. In each of these cases—
and with varying degrees of success—national drafters held their country’s unique cultural,
historical, and political experiences up against the collective database of international
experiences to divine commonalities, mutual priorities, shared aspirations, and points of
divergence. Although no bright line rule has emerged requiring states drafting new bills of rights
to undertake such a comparative assessment or import wholesale the standards contained in the
major international human rights instruments, the pattern of consultation and endorsement is
undeniable and may even signal an emerging international customary norm.8 Indeed, the
European Union has in the past made diplomatic recognition of states conditional on their
willingness to pledge respect for human rights and provide legal “guarantees for the rights of
ethnic and national groups and minorities.”9
This paper posits that beginning the arduous task of drafting a bill of rights from a standpoint of
openness towards comparativism and engagement with international norms affords the process
several advantages. First, it informs the public at large that the discussion over the nature and
scope of rights does not occur in the vacuum of domestic politics alone, but rather implicates
larger ideas relevant to humanity as a whole.10 Second, it allows states the ability to consciously
2

The majority of these states integrated bills of rights into their new constitutional documents. New Zealand focused
exclusively on drafting a standalone bill of rights, a process currently being contemplated by Australia.
3 Though ultimately deleted from Iraq’s 2005 constitution, a draft version contained a provision that would have
explicitly provided individuals “the rights contained in international human rights agreements to which Iraq is a
party as long as those rights did not contradict the provisions of the constitution.” Ashley S. Deeks, Matthew D.
Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 32. The final constitutional text specifies
that Iraq “shall observe the principles of good neighborliness…and respect its international obligations.” Art. 8,
Constitution of Iraq, 2005.
4 Afghanistan’s constitution requires the state to “abide by the UN charter, international treaties, international
conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Art. 7, Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2003.
5 New Zealand’s 1990 Bill of Rights stipulates that one of its purposes is to “To affirm New Zealand’s commitment
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Public Act 1990
No 109 (Date of assent 28 August 1990).
6 In central and eastern Europe generally, international law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), was “universally perceived” as one
of the most important sources of human rights used for modeling new constitutional regulations. Wiktor Osiatynski,
Rights In New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111, 161.
7 It is widely acknowledged that South Africa’s constitution drafting process borrowed from international treaties,
national constitutions and international and foreign jurisprudence. Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional
Borrowings On the Drafting of South Africa’s Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, 1 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 176, 177.
8 This paper is limited to exploring the relevancy of one possible emerging international human rights norm on the
bill of rights dialogue unfolding in Australia. The larger question of whether states may be obligated to incorporate
international human rights standards under customary international law when drafting a bill of rights is set aside for
another occasion.
9 Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’
adopted by the Council of the European Community on 17 December 1991, reprinted in Europe (No. 5632, n.s.), 18
December 1991.
10 By this, I simply mean that the experience of one state’s drafting process and final instrument may in the future
help inform the drafting process of the next state contemplating a new or revised bill of rights.
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check draft domestic standards against their pre-existing international obligations under treaty or
customary law. This, in turn affords drafters an opportunity to answer clearly and from the outset
basic questions such as whether international or regional human rights treaty obligations will be
directly enforceable or justiciable on the municipal level. Even where existing treaty rights are
determined to be non-justiciable, drafters can still test to what extent draft domestic standards
measure up against international norms. 11 Finally, exploring comparative and international
experiences situates the debate in a broader context that is necessarily richer, more diverse, more
informative, and more comprehensive. By plugging into this fecund ideascape, drafters can build
up a robust domestic understanding of the content of rights, their related limitations, the
dynamics of public-private and individual-group relationships, and the existing mechanisms for
balancing rights where the inevitable conflicts arise. Related to this, exploring comparative and
international sources affords the benefit of alerting drafters to emerging rights or norms that
might otherwise not figure in the domestic debate, thus providing an enhanced opportunity to
further adjust the draft language. Ultimately, such efforts—although more time-consuming and
complex—can challenge pre-existing ideas and limitations, and generally result in a more vibrant
drafting process as well as a more thoroughly “beta-tested” final product.
Particularly in light of Australia’s long history of international engagement 12 and ongoing
commitment to international human rights, 13 incorporating an earnest assessment of comparative
experiences and benchmarks into a bill of rights drafting process seems a natural and worthy
step. This approach also respects the desire of many Australians today to see their government
“protect and promote all the human rights reflected in its obligations under international human
11

This advantage resonates with the Australian Human Rights Commission’s existing mandate, which includes
“making human rights values part of everyday life and language” and “keeping government accountable to national
and international human rights standards.” Australian Human Rights Commission, “About the Commission,” http://
www.hreoc.gov.au/about/index.html. Australia’s federal parliament established the Commission (formerly the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission) in 1986 as an independent statutory body that reports to
parliament through the Attorney-General.
12 For example, H. V. Evatt, an Australian, served as President of the UN General Assembly during the adoption and
proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Australia was an original signatory to that Declaration.
The Evatt Foundation, “Doc Evatt: A brilliant & controversial character,” http://evatt.labor.net.au/about_evatt/.
13 In the words of the Australian government: “Australia’s commitment to the aims and purposes of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights reflects our national values and is an underlying principle of Australia’s engagement
with the international community.” Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Australia:
Seeking human rights for all,” http://www.dfat.gov.au/hr/hr_for_all.html and “Human Rights,” http://
www.dfat.gov.au/hr/. Australia maintains a seat on the current UN Human Rights Council and is a state party to all
but two of the nine main human rights treaties. It regularly reports to each of the bodies responsible for overseeing
the implementation of these treaties. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Regional Office for the Pacific, Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties: Added Value for the Pacific
Region, July 2009, 15, http://pacific.ohchr.org/docs/RatificationBook.pdf. Australia has not signed or ratified the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families,
which entered into force on July 1, 2003. At the end of 2009, this treaty had mustered only 42 state parties. With the
exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no western or central European state has ratified the treaty; Serbia is the only
other European signatory to the convention (status as at: January 1, 2010). http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-13&chapter=4&lang=en. Australia also has not signed the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. This treaty has not yet
entered into force because it lacks the minimum number of state parties; twenty ratifications are required, only 18
have been secured to date (status as at: January 1, 2010). http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-16&chapter=4&lang=en.
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rights law.”14 Indeed, the view of the Australian government appears to go one step further,
identifying the advancement of human rights as every nation’s responsibility: “[T]he function of
government is to safeguard the dignity and rights of individuals, whose lives should be free of
violence, discrimination, vilification, and hatred…we do not rest on our laurels. We continue to
strive to protect and promote human rights and to address disadvantage.”15
The issue then arises: surely existing international standards represent the normative floor rather
than the ceiling. And Australia, given its position, can and should aspire to adopt not only
existing standards but also the emerging ones that embody the normative human rights clouds as
well. As Jacek Kurczewski and Barry Sullivan point out, the notion of minimum standards in
human rights law “dialectically entails as well the notion of something more demanding than the
minimum—that is, the possible expansion of rights to which people are entitled.”16 From this
perspective, many additional questions follow: How much further should Australia go? What is
the state of play regarding cutting edge issues such as intersex and transsex rights, the right to an
adequate standard of living,17 and migrant rights? What, if anything, should a bill of rights say on
these issues?
At least in part, these questions can be addressed procedurally within the discussion over
whether the bill of rights will be a succinctly worded statement that takes a general approach, or
a longer document that engages specificities. However, beyond this, substantively, drafters still
have a duty to inform themselves—and Australians generally—of what, if any, emerging human
rights issues are relevant and how they should be addressed. As the Law Council of Australia
suggested during the National Human Rights Consultation process, “Australia should actively
engage with the process of developing new human rights principles through its interaction with
international human rights bodies.”18 Obviously, this responsibility doesn’t begin and end with
the international bodies; rather, it necessarily arises in the context of interactions on the home
front as well.
Against this backdrop, the following article addresses the emerging norm of “defamation of
religion”, one recent flashpoint in the international human rights dialogue that merits the
attention of all parties playing a role in any drafting process. In the next section, I offer a brief
14

National Human Rights Consultation, National Human Rights Consultation Report, 30 September 2009, 73,
http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/
Report_NationalHumanRightsConsultationReportDownloads#pdf (hereinafter National Human Rights Consultation
Report).
15 Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, “Human Rights,” http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/
agd.nsf/Page/Humanrightsandanti-discrimination_Humanrights (emphasis added).
16 Jacek Kurczewski and Barry Sullivan, The Bill of Rights and the Emerging Democracies, 65-SPG LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 251, 259.
17 The National Human Rights Consultation Report has recommended that “if economic and social rights are listed
in a federal Human Rights Act, those rights not be justiciable and that complaints be heard by the Australian Human
Rights Commission.” National Human Rights Consultation, National Human Rights Consultation Report, 30
September 2009, xxxv, http://www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/
Report_NationalHumanRightsConsultationReportDownloads#pdf (hereinafter National Human Rights Consultation
Report).
18 National Human Rights Consultation Report, 72.
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comparative history of the offense of blasphemy to help contextualize the intended meaning of
defamation of religion. The third part of this article discusses how defamation of religion became
the focus of dozens of United Nations (UN) resolutions, assesses the challenges associated with
grafting the legal concept of defamation onto the mercurial notion of religion and its potential
implications for existing international law, and takes stock of the ongoing debate as it stands
today. The fourth part of this article draws some preliminary conclusions concerning the possible
impact of enforcing a norm against defamation of religion and lastly considers to what extent—if
at all—Australia should incorporate a response to this emerging norm in any future bill of rights.

II. A Comparative Overview of the Offense of Blasphemy: A
Foundation for Understanding Defamation of Religion
A. Blasphemy in the West
Plainly stated, in theological terms, blasphemy is “a direct criticism of God and sacred
objects.”19 In many states today, the offenses of blasphemy and heresy represent antiquated
efforts to protect a worldview that comports with a given ruler’s religious persuasion. The legal
definition of blasphemy “developed historically to meet various, primarily political rather than
religious, perceptions of a need for the law to protect institutions, originally the State itself.”20 In
other words, the challenge posed by alleged heretics and blasphemers represented nothing less
than an act of state treason threatening the very foundation of a society laid with the brick and
mortar of an exclusive religious conviction.21 The state could level blasphemy-related charges
against an individual to protect the social or ideological underpinnings of society, or more
specifically, use such charges “to suppress the expression of religious beliefs or opinions”
perceived to be incorrect or unpopular with adherents of the dominant group.22 With the offense
of blasphemy enforced by the state, any nonconformist criticism of the dominant church—
whether real or perceived—was not only dangerous, but “necessarily wrong when emanating
from inferior subjects against their masters.”23 As U.S. Justice Felix Frankfurter famously
observed: “Blasphemy was the chameleon phrase which meant the criticism of whatever the
ruling authority of the moment established as orthodox religious doctrine.”24

19

Reid Mortensen, Blasphemy In A Secular State: A Pardonable Sin?, [1994] 17(2) UNSW LAW JL 409, 409.
Para. 7, Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, Report-Appendix 3: Blasphemy (2003),
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/9515.htm.
21 For example, in recognizing blasphemy as a common law offense in 17th century England, the court held that “to
say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil societies are preserved, and that
Christianity is parcel of the laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in
subversion of the law.” R v. Taylor (1676) 1 Vent. 293 (Taylor’s case). In this brief quote, the court made plain the
linkage between safeguarding the dominant faith and preserving the social and political order of the day.
22 Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 251, 289 (1999).
23 Leonard W. Levy, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS, 5 (1985).
24 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), 529.
20
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As religion and state gradually decoupled in the west, 25 charges of blasphemy grew more
infrequent. In the United States, prosecutions for blasphemy became “no more frequent than the
sightings of snarks.”26 Still, in England, the common law offense persisted until its abolition in
2008.27 Prior to this, UK courts concluded that blasphemy required little in the way of intent,28
could result in a sentence of hard labor,29 and only operated to protect the Church of England and
its specific doctrines rather than all religious beliefs.30 In other states where the offense was not
abolished outright, the law generally fell into disuse by alleged violations being left unprosecuted
or became unenforceable “either through stricter intent requirements or judicial attempts to strike
a balance between conflicting rights.”31
In Australia, the last successful prosecution for blasphemy occurred in 1871.32 The 1990s
ushered in an era of renewed interest related to the common law offense of blasphemy, in part

25

This trend may be linked to broader conditions of modernity leading to secularisation of society, wherein religion
“becomes increasingly a private concern of the individual and thus loses much of its public relevance and
influence.” Riaz Hassan, Expressions of religiosity and blasphemy in modern societies, in Elizabeth Burns Coleman
and Kevin White (eds.), NEGOTIATING THE SACRED: BLASPHEMY AND SACRILEGE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY,
119 (2006).
26 Leonard W. Levy, TREASON AGAINST GOD, x (1981).
27 s. 79, UK Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/
ukpga_20080004_en_1. The 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act arguably prohibits some acts that may have
previously constituted blasphemy, however its provisions apply equally to all religions. Part 3A of the Act addresses
“Hatred against persons on religious grounds.” Under Section 29B(1), “A person who uses threatening words or
behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, is guilty of an offense if he intends thereby to stir
up religious hatred.” The term “religious hatred” is defined as “hatred against a group of persons defined by
reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.” In addition to the offense requiring the impugned
communication to constitute a threat, Section 29J provides detailed protection for freedom of expression:
Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion,
criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the
beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its
adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease
practising their religion or belief system.
Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060001_en_1. The issue of
incitement is discussed at greater length below.
28 In 1979, the House of Lords affirmed a minimal threshold of intent for the offense of blasphemy, endorsing the
trial judge’s direction that “guilt of the offence of publishing a blasphemous libel did not depend on the accused
having an intent to blaspheme, but that it was sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the publication had been
intentional and that the matter published was blasphemous only the intent to publish blasphemous material as
sufficient.” R. v Lemon (Denis), [1979] A.C. 617, 618 (also known as Whitehouse v. Lemon).
29 William Gott, the last individual in the UK sentenced to a prison term for blasphemy, served nine months hard
labor for distributing pamphlets describing Jesus Christ entering Jerusalem “like a circus clown on the back of two
donkeys.” (1922) 16 CR. APP. R. 87, 89.
30 In Choudhury v UK (1991) HRLJ 172, members of Britain’s Muslim community sought unsuccessfully to
prosecute author Salman Rushdie for allegedly blaspheming against Islam in his novel, The Satanic Verses. See also
Q & A: Blasphemy law, BBC News, Oct. 18, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3753408.stm.
31 Osama Siddique and Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan—Controversial
Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 303, 354. For example, Germany’s
criminal code forbids insulting religion publicly or by dissemination of publications. However, successful
prosecution requires “the manner and content” of the insult to rise to such a level that an objective onlooker could
reasonably conclude it would disturb the peace of those targeted. Siddique and Hayat, 355.
32 R v Jones (Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court Quarter Sessions, Simpson J, 18 February 1871) in
Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 23 (at 16 June 1996) 365 Religion, ‘Status’ [365-695].
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triggered by the Salman Rushdie affair.33 In 1991, the New South Whales (NSW) parliament
requested its Law Reform Commission to explore “whether the present law relating to the
offence of blasphemy is adequate and appropriate to current conditions.”34 In undertaking its
mandate, the Commission acknowledged two key questions: first, “whether the offence [of
blasphemy] is anachronistic in a modern society…which is multicultural, pluralistic and secular,
and maintains a strict separation between Church and State”; and second, “whether the offence of
blasphemy improperly impinges upon the fundamental right of freedom of speech.”35 Because
the offense of blasphemy had not been successfully prosecuted in over a century, the
Commission also observed that there was “a real question whether blasphemy still exists in the
criminal law of New South Wales, even if it was ‘received’ as law in colonial times.”36
As part of its findings, the Commission identified “several pieces of legislation in New South
Wales…[that] assume[d] the existence of the crime” despite uncertainties regarding its reception
from England.37 Surveying the status of blasphemy in Australia’s other states and territories, the
Commission also found that apart from s. 574 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), only the
Tasmanian Criminal Code contained another express statutory reference to blasphemy, 38 while
other jurisdictions had either abolished the offense altogether or maintained it as a common law
crime.
After weighing various options, including retaining the common law offense of blasphemy,
progressive codification, selective replacement, and outright abolition, the Commission endorsed
abolition of blasphemy without a substitute or replacement offense as representing the best
option for NSW.39 This recommendation was based on the status of the offense in NSW, on
findings that there been “no prosecutions for blasphemy in other Australian states, Scotland,
Ireland, New Zealand or other comparable jurisdictions for over 50 years, and on the fact that
every law reform commission which [had] considered blasphemy law reform has recommended
abolition of the offence.”40 Notably, the Commission also found that anti-discrimination statutes
were:
better designed to preserve public order and social cohesion in a modern
democratic society, given several important considerations: the emphasis on
education and conciliation in the first instance; the clarity of the elements of the
offences, and the protection of debate or discussion carried out in good faith; the
33

See supra note 30.
Terms of Reference, New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Blasphemy, Report 74, 1994, http://
www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/nswlrc/reports/74/R74TOR.html, and http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/
R74TOC (hereinafter NSW Blasphemy Report).
35 Paras. 1.2-1.3, NSW Blasphemy Report, http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/nswlrc/reports/74/R74CHP1.html.
36 Para. 1.4, Id.
37 Para. 2.14 NSW Blasphemy Report, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/nswlrc/reports/74/
R74CHP2.html,
38 Para. 3.2, NSW Blasphemy Report, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R74CHP3.
39 Paras. 4.3 and 4.81, NSW Blasphemy Report, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/nswlrc/reports/
74/R74CHP4.html.
40 Para. 4.80, Id.
34
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more realistic penalties; and the requirement of the consent of the Attorney
General before criminal proceedings may be instituted.41
Within Australia’s Federal law, early legislation revealed several efforts to enforce antiblasphemy measures, particularly as related to books, television and film. 42 However, in the early
1990s a broader law reform initiative launched by the federal government addressing
Multiculturalism and the Law (ALRC 57), recommended that: “All references to blasphemy in
federal legislation should be removed. Offences that protect personal and religious sensibilities
should be recast in terms of ‘offensive material’.”43 This recommendation stemmed from the
Commission’s opposition to extending the law of blasphemy for the purpose of covering
religions other than Christianity. In the Commission’s view it “would be very difficult to devise a
satisfactory definition of religion [to encompass faiths other than Christianity] and would be an
unreasonable interference with freedom of expression” to perpetuate the offense of blasphemy.44
Ultimately, in the wake of these findings, Australia’s federal government acted to repeal much of
the legislation containing blasphemy-related offenses.45
More recently, in the “Piss Christ” case,46 the Catholic Archdiocese of Melbourne sought an
injunction against the display of an allegedly blasphemous photograph by artist Andres Serrano
on the grounds it constituted blasphemous libel. The photo, to be exhibited at the National
Gallery of Victoria, depicted a crucified Jesus Christ that had been, according to the artist,
immersed in urine when the photograph was taken. The Supreme Court of Victoria found against
the plaintiff, based in part on its finding that there was “no evidence…of any unrest of any kind
following or likely to follow the showing of the photograph in question”, and because of the
need for the court to contextualize the dispute with “regard to contemporary standards in a
multicultural, partly secular and largely tolerant, if not permissive, society.”47 The Court
concluded that if it were to “grant the relief sought by the plaintiff, [it] might thereby use the
force of the law to prevent that which, by the same law, is lawful”48
B. Blasphemy in Muslim States
As noted above, blasphemy at its origin represented an ecclesiastical offense. In the west,
implementation and enforcement of the offense through the common law provided protection
41

Para. 4.31, Id.
Para. 3.12, NSW Blasphemy Report, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R74CHP3.
43 Para. 7.59, Australian Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, ALRC Report 57, 1992.
44 Para. 7.59, Id.
45 The Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 repealed the previous Customs
(Cinematograph Films) Regulations of the Commonwealth. The prohibition against blasphemous works or articles
contained in the 1956 Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations was discarded by amendment. Likewise, section
118 of the Broadcasting Act 1942 prohibiting the broadcast of blasphemous material was similarly excised by virtue
of being replaced with the Broadcasting Services (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act
1992.
46 Pell v Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria, 1998 2 V.R. 391. For a discussion of this case, see
Bede Harris, Pell v Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria: Should Blasphemy Be A Crime? The
‘Piss Christ’ Case and Freedom of Expression, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 217.
47 Pell v Council of Trustees.
48 Id.
42
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only for Christianity—and even then, often only for specific iterations of that faith. All other
comers—including Muslims, Jews, and Hindus alike—were thus effectively barred from
bringing the wrath of the law to bear against the perceived disparagement of their respective
religions.
Similar to the Christian west, governments in the Muslim world likewise sought to outlaw
offenses equivalent to blasphemous conduct. Under the systems that emerged, authorities
invoked religious or statutory law to impose a variety of penalties against blasphemy, apostasy
and other related acts.49 Like their western counterparts, these parallel offenses 50 also shared a
clearly identifiable connection with notions of treason or sedition against the state. This resulted
in part due to the absence of any bright line separation between religion and state under the
banner of Islam.51 As Cherif Bassiouni has remarked, Islam provides a “holistic conception of
life, government, law and hereafter. There is no division of church and state; there is no division
between matters temporal and religious, and between different aspects of law.”52
While the current trend in the west indicates a tendency to discard blasphemy offenses into the
trash bin of history,53 there appears to be no similar parallel movement within Muslim states. For
example, in Pakistan, a declared Islamic state,54 existing blasphemy laws have resulted in
“several miscarriages of justice” and “exacerbate a growing environment of dogma and
intolerance—spawning a culture of extremism and violence.”55 According to the 2009 U.S.
Department of State International Religious Freedom Report, contravention of Pakistan’s
blasphemy laws may result in “death for defiling Islam or its prophets; life imprisonment for
defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Qur’an; and 10 years’ imprisonment for insulting
another’s religious feelings.” The report also concludes that Pakistani authorities “routinely used
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See for example Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Human Rights Law, and the
Salman Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 375 and Perry S. Smith, Speak No Evil: Apostasy, Blasphemy
and Heresy in Malaysian Syariah Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 357.
50 Although no exact offense parallel to the Judeo-Christian offense of blasphemy exists under Islam, insulting God,
Mohammed or any other aspect of divine revelation amounts to an offense under Sharia. See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes
or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 WIILJ 349, 351-352. The article provides a long list of
examples of blasphemy-type offenses prosecuted in the Muslim world. See also Hassan, Expressions of Religiosity
and Blasphemy in Modern Societies, in Coleman and White, supra note 25.
51 See for example Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS, 167-68 (4th ed.
2007) and Donna E. Arzt, The Treatment of Religious Dissidents Under Classical and Contemporary Islamic Law in
Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, eds., RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS
PERSPECTIVES (1996).
52 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Speech, Religious Discrimination, and Blasphemy, American Society of International Law
Proceedings, Apr. 5-8, 1989, 83 ASILPROC 427, 433.
53 An exception to this trend is evident in Ireland’s recently passed Defamation Act, which includes provisions
covering the offense of blasphemy. The Defamation Act is discussed in Part IV below.
54 For a closer examination of how the constitutional systems of Muslim states address religion-state relations, see
Tad Stahnke and Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A
Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly Muslim Countries, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 947
(2005).
55 Siddique and Hayat, supra note 31, 384.
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the blasphemy laws to harass religious minorities and vulnerable Muslims and to settle personal
scores or business rivalries.”56
In Malaysia, where Islam is the official state religion, the Syariah Criminal Offences Act
enumerates “Offences Relating to the Sanctity of the Religion of Islam and its Institution,”
including:
7. Any person who orally or in writing or by visible representation or in any other
manner—
(a) insults or brings into contempt the religion of Islam;
(b) derides, apes or ridicules the practices or ceremonies relating to the religion of
Islam; or
(c) degrades or brings into contempt any law relating to the religion of Islam for
the time being in force in the Federal Territories.57
Punishment for these offenses may result in a prison sentence of up to two years in addition to
any fine.
Also in Malaysia, the country’s influential National Fatwa Council issued a ban (ultimately
overturned) prohibiting Muslims from practicing yoga because it risked “destroy[ing] a Muslim’s
faith”;58 the regional Fatwa Council in the central state of Selangor threatened to sue the
Malaysian Bar Association for using the word “Allah” on its website;59 and the federal
government imposed a blanket ban on circulating or publishing cartoons of the Prophet
Mohammad after shuttering the Borneo-based Sarawak Tribune (and at least two other
newspapers) for reprinting the now notorious Jyllands-Posten caricatures. 60
In Indonesia, where the constitution is silent with regard to favoring secularism or Islam, the
government actively invokes the criminal code to prosecute alleged blasphemy-related offenses.
Under the Criminal Code, publicly “giving expression to feelings of hostility, hatred or contempt
against one or more groups of the population of Indonesia,” is punishable by a maximum
56

U.S. Dep’t of State, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2009, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/irf/2009/127370.htm. During the previous reporting period, Pakistani “authorities arrested at least 25
Ahmadis, 11 Christians, and 17 Muslims on blasphemy charges.” U.S. Dep’t of State, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM REPORT 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108505.htm.
57 §7, SYARIAH CRIMINAL OFFENCES (FEDERAL TERRITORIES) ACT 1997 (Malaysia), http://www.agc.gov.my/agc/
Akta/Vol.%2012/Act%20559.pdf. For an overview of the situation related to blasphemy in Malaysia, see Smith,
supra note 49
58 Muslims Warned to Avoid Blasphemous Yoga, WELT ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2008, http://www.welt.de/english-news/
article2766685/Muslims-warned-to-avoid-blasphemous-yoga.html, and Robin Brant, Malaysia Clerics Issue Yoga
Fatwa, BBC NEWS, Nov. 22, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7743312.stm.
59 The Becket Fund, Malaysia: Legal Body Faces Lawsuit for Using Word ‘Allah’, Mar. 23, 2009, http://
becketinternational.wordpress.com/2009/03/23/malaysia-legal-body-faces-lawsuit-for-using-word%E2%80%98allah%E2%80%99/.
60 Mark Bendeich, Malaysia Bans Prophet Cartoons as Protests Flare, REUTERS, Feb. 10, 2006, http://
www.wwrn.org/sparse.php?idd=20391. See also Government Measures Limit Spread of Anger in Malaysia, ASIA
MEDIA, May 18, 2006, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/religion/article.asp?parentid=45889.
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imprisonment of four years or a fine.61 While the Indonesian law as written is admirable for its
attempt to move away from protecting only the majority faith from expressions of “hostility,
hatred or contempt,” in practice, the U.S. Department of State has concluded that instances
where the law has “been enforced have almost always involved blasphemy and heresy against
Islam.”62 Human Rights Watch has likewise concluded, “Indonesian laws prohibiting blasphemy
are primarily applied to practices perceived to deviate from mainstream Islam.”63
In practice, blasphemy charges have been invoked in a variety of situations, including an art
exhibit containing photographic representations of fig leaf-covered Adam and Eve,64 and against
various individuals claiming to be reincarnations of the Prophet Muhammad (sentenced to three
years),65 and the archangel Gabriel (sentenced to two and a half years),66 among others. Related
to these efforts, but on a much broader scale, the government has severely restricted and even
banned certain activities of the Ahmadi community, including public religious worship, as part of
a clampdown pattern targeting groups deemed “heretical”, “deviant” or heterodox.67 Following
Malaysia’s lead, Indonesia’s Ulema Council issued a similar fatwa prohibiting Muslims from
practicing Yoga for fear it might corrupt their faith.68
Simply stated, unlike the present situation in most Western countries, snark sightings remain
quite a common occurrence in the Muslim world. Many Muslim states continue to shield Islam
from perceived criticism, however minor, and in certain instances use anti-blasphemy measures
as an offensive tool to stifle the free exercise of religious belief for minority faiths and Muslim
dissidents alike. Significantly, as illustrated in the above examples, such practices are not
exclusive to religious regimes but rather may be observed across the spectrum of Muslim
constitutional models—declared Islamic states, states with Islam declared the official religion,

61 Art.

156, PENAL CODE OF INDONESIA, Feb. 1952 (last amended 1999), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3ffbcee24.html. For the purpose of these provisions, the term “group” is defined as being distinguished by “race,
country of origin, religion, origin, descent, nationality or constitutional condition.”
62 U.S. Dep’t of State, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/
2008/108407.htm/. The State Department report notes dozens of individuals charged and convicted under
Indonesia’s criminal code.
63 Human Rights Watch, 2009 WORLD REPORT, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf.
64 Indonesia: Blasphemy Case Against Adam and Eve Photo Exhibit, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 3, 2006,
http://religion.info/english/articles/article_227.shtml.
65 Peter Gelling, Indonesia Bans Sects It Deems Blasphemous, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/16/world/asia/16indo.html.
66 Andra Wisnu, Lia Eden Sentenced to Prison, Again, THE JAKARTA POST, Jun. 3, 2009, http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/03/lia-eden-sentenced-prison-again.html.
67 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, 171, http://www.uscirf.gov/images/
AR2009/final%20ar2009%20with%20cover.pdf.
68 Niniek Karmini, Indonesian Muslims Banned from Practicing Yoga, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 26, 2009, http://
www.wwrn.org/sparse.php?idd=30085.
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states without an official religion, and secular states alike.69 It is from within this milieu that the
movement to prohibit “defamation of religion”—originally expressed in the more specific and
decidedly less ecumenical slogan “defamation of Islam”—emerged a decade ago to begin its
journey in search of international legitimacy.

III. Defamation of Religion: Blasphemy Goes International
A. Origins of Defamation of Religion at the United Nations
The 57-member state Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which represents “the
collective voice of the Muslim world,”70 is responsible for spearheading the effort to secure
international condemnation of acts deemed defamatory of religion—and more specifically,
defamatory of Islam. In addition to its own ongoing internal reporting and resolutions on the
issue,71 the OIC—working through its individual member states—has focused on adding
defamation of religion to the agendas of various UN bodies. The OIC submitted its first
resolution addressing defamation of religion, originally entitled “Defamation of Islam” to the
now defunct Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in 1999.72 This proposed resolution
sought to combat perceived negative international media coverage of “Islam as a religion hostile
to human rights.” In the view of Pakistan’s UN ambassador, this negative media coverage
amounted to a “defamation compaign” [sic] against the religion and its adherents to which the
UNCHR had to react.73 The draft expressed alarm at negative stereotyping of Islam and concern
at the spread of intolerance against Islam specifically. Further, it called upon the “Special
Rapporteur on religious intolerance to continue to devote attention to attacks against Islam and
attempts to defame it.”74

69

Because of space constraints, examples on anti-blasphemy measures in Turkey, a declared secular Muslim state,
have been omitted. See Robert C. Blitt, Bottom-up Migration of Anti-Constitutional Norms: The Case of Defamation
of Religion. (draft article on file with the author). Despite the apparent unity in governmental approach across all
four Muslim constitutional systems, recent sociological data on blasphemy hints at the possibility that differentiation
may exist among the citizenry of these states, with public opinion more closely mirroring the expectation that
declared secular states would demonstrate little interest in upholding blasphemy-related offenses while their more
religious counterparts would tend towards favoring such laws. See Hassan, Expressions of Religiosity and
Blasphemy in Modern Societies, in Coleman and White.
70 Organization of the Islamic Conference, About OIC, http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52.
71 For a more detailed account of these activities, see Blitt, Migration, supra note 69.
72 The first reference to defamation of Islam at the UN may be traced back to 1997. In reaction to a report addressing
“Islamist and Arab Anti-Semitism” prepared by the UN special rapporteur on racism, Indonesia’s ambassador
alleged “defamation of our religion Islam and blasphemy against its Holy Book Qur’an.” Rene Wadlow and David
Littman, Blasphemy at the United Nations?, IV MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY 4, Dec. 1997, http://www.meforum.org/
379/blasphemy-at-the-united-nations. The UNCHR responded by adopting a consensus decision—supported by the
United States and several other Western countries, which expressed “indignation and protest at the content of such
an offensive reference to Islam and the Holy Qur’an,” “Affirmed that that offensive reference should have been
excluded from the report;” and “Requested…Special Rapporteur to take corrective action in response.” UN
Commission on Human Rights, Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Resolution
1997/125, Apr. 18, 1997, http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/
b195aa6921759f1a8025666c004a94d8?Opendocument.
73 Para. 1-2, UN Commission on Human Rights, “Summary Record of the 61st Meeting,” E/CN.4/1999/SR.61, Oct.
19, 1999.
74 Para. 5, UN Commission on Human Rights, “Defamation of Islam”, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.40, Apr. 20, 1999
(draft resolution submitted by Pakistan on behalf of members of the OIC).
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In response to Pakistan’s draft, Western governments proposed amendments to de-specify Islam
and approach the challenge of discrimination from a more general perspective inclusive of all
religions, including minority faiths.75 Subsequent Pakistani sub-amendments sought to preserve
specificity relating to “defamatory attacks against [Islam]”76 and stressed that removing the
resolution’s focus on Islam “would defeat the purpose of the text, which was to bring a problem
relating specifically to that religion to the attention of the international community.”77 Final
negotiations resulted in a compromise that expressed concern over stereotyping of all religions
rather than only Islam and retained the term “defamation” only in the resolution title.78 The
representative from Pakistan hailed the OIC member states’ “considerable flexibility” in agreeing
to a compromise resolution.79 At the same time, Germany’s representative, speaking on behalf of
the European Union (EU), stressed the EU’s collective “wish to make it clear that they did not
attach any legal meaning to the term ‘defamation’ as used in the title.”80
This seemingly inconsequential non-event served as defamation’s proverbial foot in the door for
two reasons: first, it tasked two UN Special Rapporteurs with taking into account provisions of
the resolution in future reports to the UNCHR; and second, it expressed the Commission’s intent
“to remain seized of the matter.”81 In short, from this point forward, the concept of defamation of
religion became systematized and integrated not only into the UNCHR agenda, but also into the
mandates of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and the Special Rapporteur on
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance.
Over the relatively short time span of 10 years, the Commission, its successor the Human Rights
Council (HRC), and even the UN General Assembly (UNGA) proceeded to pass regular
resolutions dedicated to combating “Defamation of Religion.” A review of these resolutions
demonstrates that invocation of the term “defamation” skyrocketed, from a solitary reference in
1999, to 23 references in 2009. Furthermore, placement of the term defamation within the
resolution also shifted dramatically, from no references whatsoever in the body of the resolution,
up to seven references in preambular passages in 2005, and to eight preambular references
coupled with eight additional operative references most recently in 2009. 82 By employing the
term “defamation” repeatedly and in the operative parts of these resolutions, its legal meaning—
however questioned initially—necessarily takes on a new significance. To understand this
75

Para. 8, UN Commission on Human Rights, “Amendment to draft resolution E/CN.4/1999/L.40,” UN Doc. E/CN.
4/1999/L.90, Apr. 22, 1999. The amendments were put forward by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (joined by the Czech Republic, Latvia, Norway and Poland).
76 Para. 8, UN Commission on Human Rights, “Proposed sub-amendments to the amendments to draft resolution E/
CN.4/1999/L.40 contained in document E/CN.4/1999/L.90,” UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/L.104, April 28, 1999.
77 Para. 8, “Summary Record of the 61st Meeting.”
78 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1999/82: “Defamation of Religions,” Apr. 30, 1999, UN Doc. E/
CN.4/RES/1999/82, adopted without a vote.
79 Para. 1, UN Commission on Human Rights, “Summary Record of the 62nd Meeting,” Apr. 30, 1999, UN Doc. E/
CN.4/1999/SR.62, Nov. 17, 1999.
80 Para. 9, Id.
81 Para. 6, UNCHR Resolution 1999/82, supra note 78.
82 Data on file with the author. For a more detailed treatment of how defamation of religion evolved over time at the
United Nations, see Blitt, Migration, supra note 69.
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significance, it is helpful to start with the legal definition of “defamation” and explore the
implications of efforts to graft this concept onto protection of religion within the framework of
international law.
B. Defining Defamation of Religion: Challenges to Existing Principles of
Defamation Law and International Human Rights Law
!"#$%&'()*+%&,%-#.'/+0+12%#3+4
Although specifics may vary state to state, defamation is classically defined as the “act of
harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third person”83 or as an
intentional false communication that injures another person’s reputation.84 From this starting
point, several important elements are obvious: First, the offense must be directed at individuals
(or possibly in certain instances at groups 85) rather than against an idea, concept, or set of beliefs.
Second, if the statement is merely an opinion, rather than an assertion of fact, a claim for
defamation typically cannot be supported. In addition to the existing common law defense of fair
comment,86 under Australia’s unified defamation law, a statutory defense to alleged defamation
arises, inter alia, where the defendant proves that:
(a) the matter was an expression of opinion of the defendant rather than a
statement of fact, and
(b) the opinion related to a matter of public interest, and
(c) the opinion is based on proper material. 87
In the United States, the Supreme Court has ruled that the distinction between fact and opinion,
though less bright than previously held, is still relevant in establishing whether a defamation
claim will be actionable. Following the decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,88
communication in the form of an opinion may nevertheless be considered defamatory, but only if
the statement of the opinion implies that the speaker has knowledge of provably false (i.e.
defamatory) but undisclosed facts.89 In other words, the opinion may be defamatory only if it is
premised on some precursor provably false statement of fact. However, here the plaintiff must
show that the false implications of the communication were made with some level of fault to
83

Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
The right to freedom of opinion and expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ambeyi Ligabo, E/CN.
4/2006/55, Dec. 30, 2005. This applies to individuals and corporations alike.
85 In Beauharnais v. Illinois, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to endorse the notion of group libel
claims (343 U.S. 250, (1952)). However, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals has observed that “cases decided
since Beauharnais…have substantially undercut this support. To the extent that Beauharnais can be read as
endorsing group libel claims, it has been so weakened by subsequent cases such as New York Times that the Seventh
Circuit has stated that these cases ‘had so washed away the foundations of Beauharnais that it cannot be considered
authoritative’…We agree with the Seventh Circuit that the permissibility of group libel claims is highly questionable
at best.” Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc. 867 F.2d 1188, 1200.
86 D. Rolph, A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws (2008) 16(3) TORTS LAW JOURNAL 207-248, 237.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335071.
87 Art. 31(1), Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/da200599/.
88 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695.
89 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, REST 2d TORTS § 566.
84
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support recovery. As this practice indicates, a showing of intent may be required in certain
instances.
Although the decision in Milkovich represented a more nuanced elaboration on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Gertz v Robert Welch, it preserved the principle rule that “there is no such
thing as a false idea” under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.90 Moreover, Milkovich
reaffirmed that statements which could not “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts”
about an individual would fail to satisfy the test for defamation. 91 In the majority’s view, this
protection served as “assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative
expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of
our Nation.”92
5"#6%/2(7,%-#+#8(29,:,12%#2%#.'/+0+12%#2/#;'<,-,2%=#.'>%,12%+<#+%&#3'-+<#?0@'&,0'%*)
With this very basic definition in hand, the problem of superimposing defamation as a legal
framework for protecting religion becomes evident. In the first instance, enforcement of and
limitations on defamation vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction making it virtually impossible to
extract any clear and consistent rules regarding its application to individuals. Beyond this,
applying defamation to various systems of belief that come with their own set of unique but
improvable truth claims further complicates the effort. These claims often may be directly at
odds with the competing claims of another religious group. Indeed, the latter group may even
consider such rival views “defamatory”. However, defamation law can’t effectively address these
scenarios because they do not deal in provable statements of fact. The problem of providing a
workable definition of “defamation of religion” is so apparent, that after 10 years of passing
resolutions, neither the HRC nor the UNGA has ventured to undertake the task. 93
The conceptual challenge of “defamation of religion” is exacerbated further when considering
the nature and purpose of international human rights law. To begin, international human rights
law, and specifically the right to freedom of religion or belief, “does not include the right to have
a religion or belief that is free from criticism or ridicule.”94 This same body of law also
recognizes the right of individuals to freedom of expression. And while the right to free
expression may be limited in certain narrowly tailored contexts, hurt feelings alone do not rise to
the level of a violation of rights that would justify such a limitation.95 Recognizing such a
limitation under international human rights law would entail nothing less than a reordering of
90

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 340.
Milkovich, supra note 88, 2706.
92 Id.
93 Instead, there is much effort to blur the boundary between defamation and the concept of incitement. See Blitt,
Migration, supra note 69.
94 Para. 36, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Racism on the incitement to racial and religious hatred and the promotion of tolerance,” UN
Doc. A/HRC/2/3, 20 Sept. 2006.
95 Restrictions must be provided by law, and be necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; and
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.” Art. 19(3),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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rights and result in the censoring of free expression by limiting, inter alia, “scholarship on
religious issues and…asphyxiat[ing] honest debate or research.”96
This reordering would also undermine freedom of religion, the very right ostensibly requiring
greater protection by those advocating in favor of outlawing defamation. The history associated
with protecting religious freedom is intimately tied to the protection of minority rights.97
However, on the ground, it is clear that blasphemy charges have in the past been used to stifle
freedom of religion, particularly for minority groups or those disfavored by the ruling party. By
granting the charge of defamation an international imprimatur, it risks being used not as a shield,
but rather as a sword to silence those deemed to have religious or political beliefs at odds with
the majority faith. This risk explains why the UN Human Rights Committee, the body of
independent experts tasked with interpreting the ICCPR’s provisions and monitoring their
implementation,98 concluded almost 20 years ago that:
If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes,
proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in
any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 [freedom of thought, conscience
and religion] or any other rights recognized under the Covenant nor in any
discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who
oppose it.99
Further still, establishing defamation of religion as a legitimate basis for suppressing speech
would essentially ascribe greater priority to the protection of a set of ideas than to individuals,
the very group human rights law was envisioned to protect! Such an outcome would be
antithetical to the very foundation of international human rights law.
Despite these red flags—and in contradiction to the recommendations of at least one UN Special
Rapporteur—the UN General Assembly and the Human Rights Council in 2007 proceeded with
efforts to modify longstanding consensus surrounding human rights norms. In similar
resolutions, both UN bodies emphasized:
…that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which should be exercised
with responsibility and may therefore be subject to limitations as provided by law
and necessary for respect of the rights or reputations of others, protection of
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Para. 42, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/3, supra note 94.
See for example the 1919 treaty between Poland and the League of Nations (Little Treaty of Versailles) addressing
minority rights in the newly created Polish state, 28 June, 1919.
98 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Human Rights Committee:
Monitoring civil and political rights,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm.
99 Para. 10, UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion (Art. 18), July 30, 1993.
97
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national security or of public order, public health or morals and respect for
religions and beliefs. 100
The content of such resolutions signal nothing less than surreptitious efforts by the UNGA and
the HRC—the body “responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe”101—to amend the longstanding legal consensus provided under the ICCPR.
Using the limitations agreed upon in ICCPR article 19 as a jumping off point, both resolutions
unilaterally add a limitation on the right of freedom of expression, namely “respect for religions
and beliefs.” In other words, in the minds of the majorities within the UNGA and HRC, speech
labeled defamatory—or blasphemous—of religion is no longer worthy of protection, regardless
of contrary views expressed by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief or in the
actual treaty text as provided under the ICCPR.
The steady effort on the part of OIC member states to entrench defamation of religion as a norm
again bore fruit in 2008, when the UNGA passed a similar resolution, calling, inter alia, for
increased restrictions on freedom of expression.102 During voting in the Third Committee on the
draft resolution submitted by Pakistan (on behalf of OIC member states),103 the European Union
maintained its position that:
[It] did not see the concept of defamation of religions as valid in a human rights
discourse; international human rights law protected primarily individuals, rather
than religions as such, and religions or beliefs in most States did not enjoy legal
personality. 104
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See para. 9, UN General Assembly, “Combating Defamation of Religions,” UN Doc. A/RES/61/164, Feb. 21,
2007, and para. 10, Human Rights Council, “Combating defamation of religions,” UN Doc. A/HRC/Res/4/9/, 30
March 2007. The vote in the General Assembly was 111 votes to 54, with 18 abstentions. In the Council, the
recorded vote was 24 to 14 with nine abstentions.
101 United Nations, “The Human Rights Council,” http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/.
102 Para. 10, General Assembly Resolution 62/154: Combating Defamation of Religions, UN Doc. A/RES/62/154,
Mar. 6, 2008. The resolution passed with a recorded vote of 108 to 51, with 25 abstentions. See Annex X,
Department of Public Information, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling For Moratorium On Death
Penalty: Adopts 54 Resolutions, 12 Decisions Recommended by Third Committee, UN Doc. GA/10678, Dec. 18,
2007, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10678.doc.htm
103 Pakistan, “Combating Defamation of Religions” (draft resolution), UN Doc. A/C.3/62/L.35, Nov. 2, 2007.
Subsequently, Belarus and Venezuela joined in sponsoring the draft resolution. Report of the Third Committee,
“Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving
the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” UN Doc. A/62/439/Add.2. The Third
Committee endorsed the draft by a vote of 95 in favor to 52 against, with 30 abstentions. For the voting record, see
Annex III, UN Department of Public Information, Third Committee Approves Three Country-Specific Texts On
Human Rights: Despite Opposition Led By Developing Countries, UN Doc. GA/SHC/3909, Nov. 20, 2007, http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/gashc3909.doc.htm.
104 UN Doc. GA/SHC/3909, supra note 103.
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Although some states continue to make the case that “defamation of religion” represents an
unworkable chimera, consistent majorities in the HRC and UNGA beg to differ. Despite this
majority, General Assembly resolutions are arguably only a representation of that body’s opinion
and are therefore not legally binding. In accordance with the UN Charter, the UNGA is not
intended to serve as a legislative body:
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of
any organs provided for in the present Charter, and…may make
recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security
Council or to both on any such questions or matters. 105
However, it is also generally recognized that over time, UNGA resolutions may come to reflect
and have the binding force of customary international law. The classic example of such practice
is embodied in UNGA Resolution 217A (1948), more commonly known as the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). 106 Over time, this landmark Declaration has come to be
acknowledged by a variety of authorities as reflective of customary international law norms,107
despite the fact that its drafters plainly intended it to have no legally binding effect on states. In
the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, chairperson of the UN Commission on Human Rights tasked
with drafting the document, the UDHR “was not a treaty or international agreement and did not
impose legal obligations; it was rather a statement of basic principles of inalienable human rights
setting up a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.”108
Most recently at the end of 2009, the UNGA again endorsed a resolution on combating
defamation of religion.109 Notably, the resolution “received the most ‘no’ votes of any text

105 Art.

10, Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. 993, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945
(emphasis added).
106 G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
107 See for example, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, where the U.S. Court of Appeals (2nd) held that the
prohibition against torture “has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights…” (para. 24). According to Hurst Hannum, “Many of the Universal
Declaration’s provisions also have become incorporated into customary international law, which is binding on all
states.” Hurst Hannum, The UDHR In National and International Law, Vol. 3, No. 2, FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1998), 145, 145.
108 Part B(1)(a), Chapter V., Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions; Section A., Human Rights, UNITED
NATIONS YEARBOOK SUMMARY, 1948, http://www.udhr.org/history/yearbook.htm.
109 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/156 (not yet published). The “Combating defamation of religions”
resolution as passed in the Third Committee is referenced as UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II).
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considered”110 at the Assembly’s 64th session111 even though the endorsement of a limitation on
freedom of expression based on “respect for religions and beliefs” was conspicuously missing
from the text.112 Still, the resolution continued to express “deep concern” over “the
intensification of the overall campaign of the defamation of religions,” despite offering nothing
to substantiate the finding.113
At this point, a growing rift between the special rapporteurs on freedom of expression and
religion or belief (and possibly the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights) on the
one hand, and certain member states of the General Assembly on the other, has become

110

UN Department of Public Information, “General Assembly Adopts 56 Resolutions, 9 Decisions Recommended
by Third Committee on Broad Range of Human Rights, Social, Cultural Issues,” UN Doc. GA/10905, Dec. 18,
2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/ga10905.doc.htm.
111 The resolution (UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2, part II) was adopted by a recorded vote of 80 in favor to 61 against,
with 42 abstentions, as follows:
In favor: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen.
Against: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco,
Montenegro, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal,
Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Ukraine, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu.
Abstain: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Equatorial
Guinea, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, United
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia.
Absent: Central African Republic, Gambia, Kiribati, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Zimbabwe.
See Annex VIII, UN Doc. GA/10905, supra note 110.
112 The provision is stricken from the paragraph addressing freedom of expression. It was also absent in 2008. See
Para. 10, UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II), supra note 109, and Para. 10, UN General Assembly Resolution,
“Defamation of Religions,” UN Doc. A/RES/63/171, 24 March 2009. In 2009 the Human Rights Council elected to
forgo a resolution on combating defamation of religion. This may or may not be related to the High Commissioner
on Human Rights’ deferral of a report on the issue until the HRC’s thirteenth session. “Note by the Secretariat,
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights
Council resolution 10/22 (‘Combating defamation of religions’),” UN Doc. A/HRC/12/39, 8 July 2009, http://
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-39_E.pdf. See also Human Rights Council,
“Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of
humankind, “ UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/21, 12 October 2009, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/G09/167/24/PDF/G0916724.pdf?OpenElement. In the meantime, in 2009 the HRC passed an equally ominous
new resolution entitled “Promoting human rights and fundamental freedom through a better understanding of
traditional values of humankind” for the first time. Though some of the problems raised by this resolution are
related, they fall outside the immediate scope of this article.
113 Para. 5, UN Doc. A/64/439/Add.2 (Part II), supra note 109,
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evident.114 The special rapporteurs have—only recently—attempted to steer the debate over
defamation away from its sociological overtones and anchor protection efforts into the more
palatable—and arguably legally definable—notion of incitement.115 Ironically, perhaps the
clearest indication of this desired shift in approach, a joint statement prepared by three Special
Rapporteurs, occurred as one of 15 official OHCHR “side events” during the 2009 Durban
Review Conference, lacks an official UN Document number, and is virtually buried on the UN’s
website.116 This joint statement, inter alia, called vivid attention to some of the underlying
problems with the concept of defamation of religion:
the difficulties in providing an objective definition of the term “defamation of
religions” at the international level make the whole concept open to abuse. At the
national level, domestic blasphemy laws can prove counter-productive, since this
could result in the de facto censure of all inter-religious and intra-religious
criticism. Many of these laws afford different levels of protection to different
114

The U.S. described the voting over the most recent defamation resolution as evidencing an “increasingly
splintered view” within the General Assembly. UN Department of Public Information, “Third Committee Approves
Resolution Aimed at ‘Combating Defamation of Religions’, One of 16 Draft Texts Recommended to General
Assembly,” UN Doc. GA/SHC/3966, 12 Nov., 2009, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gashc3966.doc.htm.
115 Strident support for prohibiting defamation of religion is evident across most of the reports prepared by Doudou
Diène, the special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance. For example, Diène “urges the Commission to invite the Special Rapporteur to submit a regular report
on all manifestations of defamation of religion, stressing the strength and seriousness of Islamophobia at the present
time.” Para. 37, Report by Mr. Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/17, Feb. 13, 2006. However, a survey of
the reporting by the UN special rapporteurs and the OHCHR over 10 years indicates a sudden about-face away from
the defamation concept in favor of incitement. Particularly in 2008, a sea change in attitude is evident, even in
Diène’s reporting. Although non-existent as a concern over nearly 10 years of reporting, Diène suddenly argues that
“With a view to promoting this change of paradigm, translating religious defamation from a sociological notion into
a legal human rights concept, namely incitement to racial and religious hatred,” will show “that combating
incitement to hatred is not a North-South ideological question but a reality present in a large majority of national
legislations in all regions.” Para. 45, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène, on the manifestations of defamation of religions
and in particular on the serious implications of Islamophobia on the enjoyment of all rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/9/12,
Sept. 2, 2008. In contrast to Diène, special rapporteur on freedom of religion Abdelfattah Amor early on stressed that
“very frequently, prohibitions against acts of defamation or blasphemy are misused for the purposes of outright
censorship of the right to criticism and discussion of religion and related questions,” and that in “many cases,
defamation becomes the tool of extremists in censoring and maintaining or propagating obscurantism.” Para. 97,
Interim report by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the elimination of all forms of
intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief, UN Doc. A/55/280, Sept. 8, 2000. Still Amor also
maintained that the issue of defamation reflected one of his “major concerns…because it is an intrinsic violation of
the freedom of religion or belief.” Para. 137, Report submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur on
freedom of religion or belief, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/63, Jan. 16, 2004. These reports are addressed more fully in
Blitt, Migration, supra note 69.
116 Joint statement by Mr. Githu Muigai, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance; Ms. Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief; and
Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, Freedom of Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred, OHCHR side event during the
Durban Review Conference, Geneva, 22 April 2009, 1, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/racism/rapporteur/
docs/Joint_Statement_SRs.pdf. Searching for “Joint statement of three Special Rapporteurs on incitement to racial
or religious hatred” returns only two results from http://search.ohchr.org and http://www.google.com alike.
Searching for “Freedom of Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred” returns eight hits, four of
which are UN-based websites. The document can also be accessed from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/
religion/index.htm.
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religions and have often proved to be applied in a discriminatory manner. There
are numerous examples of persecution of religious minorities or dissenters, but
also of atheists and non-theists, as a result of legislation on religious offences or
overzealous application of laws that are fairly neutral. 117
Even as certain individual and institutional voices begin endorsing this position, it remains likely
that the debate will continue to spill over to the UNGA’s forthcoming 65th session. Moreover, the
reality remains that a majority of states at the UN continue to favor promulgating a new norm
prohibiting defamation of religion, even if means fitting it in under a more consensual rubric of
incitement. As Masood Khan, Pakistan’s UN ambassador, reminded the Human Rights Council
in 2008, the ultimate objective of OIC member states is a “new instrument or convention”
addressing defamation.118 As for the OIC, it already considers defamation a legitimate and
existing norm: “The succession of UNGA and UNHRC [UN Human Rights Council] resolutions
on the defamation of religions makes it a stand alone concept with international legitimacy.”119
In light of these views, the paradigm shift advocated by the special rapporteurs remains uncertain
at best, and possibly may amount to no more than putting lipstick on a pig. Even if the UNGA
and HRC drop the effort to entrench a norm built around the specific language of defamation,
there is little indication that a compromise “incitement to religious hatred” norm would function
any differently. In other words, the incitement model may still be used by the OIC and others to
establish a justification under international law for outlawing speech, religious practice and other
actions deemed blasphemous (and ergo, an incitement) by the ruling government. It is
worthwhile to stress here that support for a defamation of religion norm transcends OIC member
states. Countries such as Russia and China continue to be strong proponents of defamation of
religion. For example, former Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Alexy II latched onto the
concept of defamation of religion as a basis for building Christian-Muslim cooperation: “in the
framework of international organizations, it seems useful to create mechanisms that make it
possible to be more sensitive to the spiritual and cultural traditions of various peoples.”120

IV. Defamation of Religion and Drafting Australia’s Bill of
Rights
In the immediate context of ongoing efforts to better protect and promote human rights in
Australia,121 the issue of defamation of religion merits consideration for a number of reasons.
First, taking stock of current international human rights debates and accounting for them in any
117

Freedom of Expression and Incitement to Racial or Religious Hatred, supra note 116, 2.
Steven Edwards, UN anti-blasphemy measures have sinister goals, observers say, CANWEST NEWS SERVICE,
Nov. 24, 2008, http://www2.canada.com/theprovince/news/story.html?id=9b8e3a6d-795d-440f-a5de-6ff6e78c78d5.
119 2nd OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, June 2008 to April 2009, issued at the 36th council of foreign
ministers, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, May 23-25, 2009, 4 (emphasis added).
120 “Response from His Holiness Patriarchy Alexy II of Moscow and all Russia [to the open letter of 138 Muslim
Theologians],” April 18, 2008, http://acommonword.com/en/a-common-word/6-christian-responses/202-responsefrom-his-holiness-patriarchy-alexy-ii-of-moscow-and-all-russia.html.
121 This is in fact one of the objectives of Australia’s National Human Rights Consultation. See http://
www.humanrightsconsultation.gov.au/www/nhrcc/nhrcc.nsf/Page/Terms_of_Reference.
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final instrument may better position that document to meet potential future challenges. For
example, by exploring the issue of defamation, drafters can address the scope and priority to be
assigned to freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief, including what limitations
may be applicable and when. Such a step can be a useful part of the process of determining
where Australia wants to situate itself and its citizens vis a vis emerging human rights norms.
This approach also syncs with the Australian Human Rights Consultation Committee’s finding
that “Newly emerging rights in international law—such as the right to a clean and sustainable
environment—are constantly in the Australian public’s gaze.”122 In other words, Australians
favor an open-minded and exploratory attitude for approaching these fundamental questions.
Such an approach should necessarily consider lex lata, but also lex ferenda and other sources of
potentially expansionary human rights concepts.
Second, a robust upfront discussion on defamation of religion can help resolve potential
inconsistencies between Australian foreign policy and national law. This is particularly important
given the arguably ambivalent position espoused by Australia and some other states towards
mixing religion into defamation-based offenses. Although Australia’s voting record at the UN
consistently has rejected defamation of religion resolutions, existing municipal legislative
initiatives indicate the possibility of allowing prosecution of such offenses in the name of
fostering tolerance. For example, Victoria’s controversial Racial and Religious Tolerance Act
specifically prohibits “conduct that incites hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or
severe ridicule” of persons “on the ground of religious belief or activity.”123 The Act also
provides various exceptions, including where conduct of the accused is deemed to have occurred
reasonably and in good faith:
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held,
or any other conduct engaged in, for—
(i) any genuine academic, artistic, religious 124 or scientific purpose; or
(ii) any purpose that is in the public interest; or
(c) in making or publishing a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of
public interest.125
While the exemptions seem broadly construed, the Act renders motive irrelevant in determining
whether an offense has occurred126 and boasts an extra-territorial effect covering conduct that
may have transpired outside of Victoria proper.127 Nevertheless, it would appear that the law does
122

National Human Rights Consultation Report, 346.
8, Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, No. 47 of 2001 (Version No. 006), incorporating amendments as
at 1 October 2009.
124 An amendment added in 2006 provides that “a religious purpose includes, but is not limited to, conveying or
teaching a religion or proselytizing.” Art. 11(2), Id.
125 Art. 11(1), Id. Article 12 addresses exceptions for private conduct, “in circumstances that may reasonably be
taken to indicate that the parties to the conduct desire it to be heard or seen only by themselves.”
126 Art. 9(1), Id.
127 Art. 8(2)(b), Id.
123 Art.
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not afford protection to religious beliefs per se, bur rather only to adherents as individuals and a
group. In Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia, the administrative tribunal found that the act:
is not concerned with the vilification of a religious belief or activity as such.
Rather it is concerned with the vilification of a person, or a class of persons, on
the ground of the religious belief or activity of the person or class…The law does
not stop a person from engaging in conduct that involves contempt for, or severe
ridicule of, a religious belief or activity, provided this does not incite hatred
against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or severe ridicule of another person or
a class of persons on the ground of such belief or activity. The law recognises that
you can hate the idea without hating the person.”128
Complicating this situation however, is the appearance of support for a norm of defamation of
religion on the ground in Australia. During a government-sponsored inquiry into revising the
existing law on blasphemy in NSW,129 the New South Wales Council of Churches (NSWCC)
offered detailed submissions in favor of a new codification of the offence of blasphemy. As part
of this re-codification effort, the NSWCC expressed support for retaining the offense but
replacing the term “blasphemy” with either “religious vilification” or “religious defamation”,
labels they argued would avoid any misunderstanding or misconstruing of the offense, but
preserve its essence—i.e., prohibiting criticism of religious beliefs and symbols.130 Drafters
should be cognizant of such expressions of domestic support for retaining a blasphemy offense
for two reasons: First, they mirror efforts on the international level to package an old offense in
new, less “offensive” terms; and second, because such supporters are still deserving of
acknowledgement and a thoughtful explanation as to why reviving blasphemy may be at odds
with other rights values contemplated as worthy of protection under any future bill of rights.
The importance of having drafters clarify Australia’s position therefore cannot be overstated.
This becomes particularly evident when considering the emerging law in Ireland. Like Australia,
Ireland has consistently voted against defamation of religion resolutions at the UN. Following
the December 2008 vote on “Combating Defamation of Religion”, Ireland’s Minister for Foreign
Affairs Micheál Martin explained: “We believe that the concept of defamation of religion is not
consistent with the promotion and protection of human rights. It can be used to justify arbitrary
limitations on, or the denial of, freedom of expression. Indeed, Ireland considers that freedom of
expression is a key and inherent element in the manifestation of freedom of thought and
conscience and as such is complementary to freedom of religion or belief.”131
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Para. 7, Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia (Anti Discrimination) [2005] VCAT 1523 (1 August 2005).
For a discussion of the Commission’s findings, see Part II(a) above.
130 Para. 4.40, NSW Blasphemy Report, http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/nswlrc/reports/74/
R74CHP4.html.
131 New blasphemy laws—Free speech is not up for discussion, IRISH EXAMINER, May 1, 2009, http://
www.examiner.ie/opinion/editorial/new-blasphemy-laws--free-speech-is-not-up-fordiscussion-90664.html#ixzz0LGSB9SNr&C.
129
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However, Ireland’s constitution has long provided that the “publication or utterance of
blasphemous, seditious, or indecent matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance
with law.132 To this end, a 2009 law enacted by the Oireachtas133 has made it an offense (carrying
a fine of up to !25,000) for anyone to publish or utter “blasphemous matter.”134 Under the new
law, in force since January 2010, a blasphemous communication “is grossly abusive or insulting
in relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby causing outrage among a substantial
number of the adherents of that religion.”135
Unlike Victoria’s Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, the Irish offense establishes a mens rea
threshold, whereby it must be demonstrated the accused intended “by the publication or utterance
of the matter concerned, to cause such outrage.”136 The law also affords a defense to the charges
if the defendant can prove “that a reasonable person would find genuine literary, artistic,
political, scientific, or academic value in the matter to which the offence relates.”137 However,
these grounds are arguably narrower than Victoria’s since no reference is made to the legitimacy
of religious purposes or to the catch-all provision “any purpose that is in the public interest.”
More problematic still, Ireland’s law explicitly protects “matters held sacred by any religion.” It
therefore appears to track more closely with the push to outlaw defamation of religion at the UN,
giving rise to an apparent inconsistency—if not outright conflict—between the law itself and
statements of Foreign Affairs Minister Martin. As it stands, Ireland’s Defamation Act potentially
may run afoul of that country’s obligations under international law and the European Convention
on Human Rights. Indeed, at least one group has already taken steps to challenge the legality of
the Act’s provisions on “blasphemous matter.”138
By encouraging the drafters of Australia’s bill of rights to confront questions related to religious
defamation and vilification directly, potential inconsistencies in law and foreign policy similar to
those arising in Ireland may be avoided. There is already some guidance on this issue emerging
from the Australian judiciary, including an arguably narrow definition of incitement,139 as well as
a directive to avoid conflating for legal purposes hatred of a given belief and hatred of adherents
132 Art.

40, Constitution of Ireland, Adopted July 1, 1937.
time limit, known as a guillotine, was imposed on the debate in the Dáil. Following the lower house vote,
Ireland’s Seanad passed the bill in nail-biting 23-22 vote, with the Green Party voting in favor. Libel law revisions
pass the Dáil, July 8, 2009, http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0708/libel.html. Stephen Collins, Defamation Bill stumbles
through Seanad after lost vote, IRISH TIMES, JUL. 10, 2009,
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/2009/0710/1224250388598.html.
134 Art. 36(1), Defamation Bill 2006. Prior drafts of the new law originally called for a maximum !100,000 fine for
the offense.
135 Art. 36(2)(a), Id.
136 Art. 36(2)(b), Id.
137 Art. 36(3), Id.
138 For example, an Irish atheist group published a series of “blasphemous” quotations by personalities including
Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Mark Twain, Salman Rushdie and Bjork in an effort to challenge the law in court. CNN,
Irish Atheists Use Bjork, Mark Twain to Challenge Blasphemy Law, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/
01/02/ireland.blasphemy.law/index.html.
139 For example, in Fletcher v Salvation Army Australia, the tribunal focused on the meaning of “incite” under the
Racial and Religious Tolerance Act: “In its context, this does not mean ‘causes’. Rather it carries the connotation of
‘inflame’ or ‘set alight’. The section is not concerned with conduct that provokes thought.” Para. 5, Fletcher v.
Salvation Army, supra note 128.
133 A strict
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of that belief. In Catch the Fire, the Victoria Court of Appeal held that the Racial and Religious
Tolerance Act does not “purport to mandate religious tolerance.”140 Further, it found that the
lower tribunal erred by failing to give due consideration to the distinction between hatred of
religious beliefs and hatred of adherents of a given faith. According to the Court, the Act “goes
no further in restricting freedom to criticise the religious beliefs of others than to prohibit
criticism so extreme as to incite hatred or other relevant emotion of or towards those others. It is
essential to keep the distinction between the hatred of beliefs and the hatred of their adherents
steadily in view.”141
Finally, even if the drafters elect to reject the defamation norm currently espoused by a majority
of UN member states, the process of reaching this decision will help establish the legal
justifications for such a position. Such a decision would occur within the context of a
comprehensive evaluation of the proposed norm, and would in turn position the bill of rights to
address, either head on or implicitly, any possible future gaps or inconsistencies between
international human rights law and Australia’s domestic implementation of rights. In short,
drafters can enshrine a more long-term vision of what rights are germane to Australia and how
these rights will operate by evaluating not only norms expressed in the relevant treaty law, but
also the emerging and potential norms that are on or just beyond the horizon. This process would
also have the benefit of strengthening Australia’s prestige on the international level by “limit[ing]
future criticism for non-compliance [and] bolster[ing] Australia’s credibility when commenting
on human rights abuses in other jurisdictions.”142

V. Conclusion
This article has argued that there is much value and benefit to opening the drafting process
surrounding a bill of rights to outside ideas and comparative data. Beyond increasing awareness
and challenging preconceptions, such an approach provides a more robust and grounded
domestic debate, and can facilitate an outcome that provides reasons and justifications for
decisions. Taken together, these measures ultimately can help establish the foundation for fewer
surprises down the road.
As the last Western democracy without some form of a bill of rights or similar instrument,
Australia finds itself in an awkward, but potentially enviable, position. On the one hand, its
citizens lack a clear understanding and expression of their rights and freedoms,143 and the
country itself risks being isolated from developments in similar legal systems and may suffer
diminished stature during human rights discussions within international fora.144 On the other
140

Para. 34, Catch the Fire Ministries v. Islamic Council of Victoria [2006] VSCA 284.
Id.
142 Australia’s National Human Rights Consultation Report has observed that passage of a Human Rights Act would
result in improved international standing for Australia. National Human Rights Consultation Report, supra note 17,
xxv.
143 The National Human Rights Consultation Committee “found a lack of understanding among Australians of what
human rights are.” National Human Rights Consultation Report, supra note 17, xvii.
144 National Human Rights Consultation Report, supra note 17, xxv.
141

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

25

hand, standing at the threshold of a decision to draft a genuinely Australian human rights
instrument holds significant promise: Of empowering citizens through a participatory drafting
model, meaningfully engaging with a body of law that has advanced dramatically in the short
span of 60 years, and creating a document that adopts not merely existing minimum standards,
but that contemplates and accounts for emerging human rights norms as well. Based on
Australia’s long history of support for international human rights and the findings of the National
Human Rights Commission, it is evident that Australians will not settle for an instrument that
merely reflects the floor without consideration of the ceiling as well.

In the context of defamation of religion, it is clear that a majority of UN member states support
greater protection of religious symbols and beliefs, even if it comes at the expense of freedom of
expression and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief. This emerging norm—
regardless of whether it is labeled “defamation of religion” or “incitement to religious hatred”—
is part of an ongoing debate over the substance of international human rights. Therefore, it
should figure in any future deliberations over the content and scope of rights in Australia. By
recognizing this issue and accounting for it during the drafting process, Australians can measure
their vision of domestic rights against the one emerging on the international level and—if
disparities arise—provide the necessary justifications in advance rather than post facto.
Undertaking this exercise has the added benefits of helping to flesh out and test more general
positions relating to issues including balancing of rights and limitations, and also clarifying
potential inconsistencies in Australia’s domestic law and foreign policy. Importantly, these
advantages should be reproducible with assessments of other similarly emerging norms the
drafters chose to investigate.
To be certain, the concept of defamation of religion is fraught with difficulties. However,
navigating through these difficulties will ensure an open and participatory process, shine greater
light on Australia’s national values and identity, and result in a more durable final instrument
capable of addressing future challenges.
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